Reganoff2 [none/use name]

China has that gig economy because that is precisely the sort of model that can help to fill in the gaps in its evolving political economic structures since the 1980s. No more iron rice bowl and cooperatives means meaningful employment for everyone is impossible, and likewise foreign investment + indigenous bourgeoisie all thrive on the constant availability of cheap and 'flexible' labor. Tbh even before the internet and apps took this to another level, the hukou system in conjunction with massive construction projects often meant that day laborers and migrants from rural areas would get absolutely shit-tier jobs doing important, necessary work, only to be given very little stability/financial security in return.

This isn't even like 'CIA propaganda' either, in fact there is a whole genre of modern Chinese literature (migrant literature - see this https://madeinchinajournal.com/2020/05/07/proletarian-nora-discussing-fan-yusu/) that is about the struggles and disappointments that migrant labor faces.

Thanks for posting this. So many people on Chapo continue to insist that any story that showcases the neoliberal aspects of Chinese political economy is just CIA bait, mostly because (I would guess) they do not speak Chinese and are not particularly familiar with how the CCP's has routinely treated striking workers and rural migrants. Instead, they just see a red flag, a 'vanguard' party, and state-owned enterprises, and assume that all contradictions between capital and labor have disappeared.

While you are correct to be wary of Western propaganda against China re: Xinjiang (particularly as Xi has himself noted that he is borrowing US-led frameworks on the 'War on Terror' anyway), I wouldn't use 'diplomats from Muslim-majority countries' as proof of anything. Most Muslim countries also stood by India when they removed the special legal protections from Kashmir and intensified their military occupation. Muslim countries are not somehow bound by oath to protect the ummah, I mean they will sell out for the sake of getting access to a big market (like India, China, etc) if they need to without any hesitation. Any insistence that because Muslim officials say something is okay it must be is I think built on the sadly outdated notion that religious solidarity is going to trump socio-economic gain.

Ah I am not referring to take out the Nizam, rather I am referring to the Indian troops massacring the communist and peasant rebels that made up the Telangana movement under the pretenses that they wanted an independent Hyderabad state.

CPC is a relatively more modern standardization as far as I know. My suspicion is CCP is used because it is a more literal translation of the original Chinese. I wouldn't attribute much else to that choice.

GMD and CCP are usually much more common. KMT is generally almost only exclusively used to refer to the party as it exists in Taiwan at the moment, though this is a somewhat recent change. I've actually never read a historian that uses CPC instead of CCP, poli sci people are somewhat different however.

I would be open to it, but tbh I sometimes find talking about it here a little exhausting. It is not that I think people have bad intentions, but there is often just a lot of bad faith interpretations of China from both demsoc AND tankie positions that navigating all the fraught politics of all and arguing with everyone becomes really tiring. But I'll think about it!

My view of history as someone who practices and cares deeply about it is that history is meaningless without also thinking about the potential paths that were lost. The CCP actively debated, molded, and changed its minority policy. They themselves admit it was not inevitable and was a conscious decision that they took. Just studying other comparative revolutions tells us that yes, other policies could have been taken and that yes we can and should be able to make judgement calls.

National sovereignty is reactionary, but it is also the only route that polities have in the face of imperialism. This is why national liberation movements often had a combination of socialist and progressive nationalist forces. Similarly in Tibet following the end of the Qing, there were struggles between different factions of 'nationalists' but also a reluctant acceptance that China is big enough tha Tibet would also be tied to it somehow. The 'somehow' in that story is important. China made the call ultimately not to pursue Soviet autonomous policies (which, to be fair, very rarely actually produced real meaningful autonomy ie look at Soviet Kazakhstan) because they considered Tibet too important due to its water resources and its sheer size. Without its minority areas, China would be 40% smaller. So national defense made annexations necessary, and perhaps I don't even disagree but it does mean we have to reckon with the fact that this was not really about spreading communism. The early CCP said as much - revolution was the thing that the Han would do, and if necessary they would do it to others. And as Zhou Enlai himself noted, much of that chauvinism had its roots in Soviet and British ethnic studies. I wouldn't call it imperialist, yes, but there was a certain imperious attitude to it that we do have to have a little introspection about. Similarly, peasants would complain about this all the time - that Party cadres would never try to understand them. This is something that the mass line corrects, imo, and without it I am very unsure as to what revolution would really look like in the long term.

Furthermore, if you spread revolution without any sort of mass support in the country you invade, you will defang any potential for local progressive forces and empower the reactionaries, thus you get Afghanistan. In the fight against reactionary tendencies, conflict itself will never be enough and I frankly do not think interventionism will ever beget lasting change. America certainly has proven that and even if you believe a communist country would act differently (though we must note that it has been rare for existing communist parties to take over an entirely different country and actually create a lasting new regime), I think we must genuinely try and understand what we want revolution to be. Does revolution mean one vision of progress that is imposed on all? Or does it mean creating novel paths for people depending on their socioeconomic and cultural structures? To me the answer is clear.

The Soviets forced the GMD to make concessions in 45 with their friendship treaty, particularly in Manchuria. They gave weapons to the CCP but then ordered them to retreat because they didn't want rail lines to warm water ports in the region to be damaged.

Again, as I've already quoted, the Soviets discouraged conflict with the GMD, wanted a united front government, and didn't believe Mao could win. The archival evidence is all there.

Regarding the ETR, the Soviets had already been holding sway in Xinjiang before via Sheng Shicai. The ETR was an attempt to perhaps encourage the province to have close relations with Soviet Central Asia. The ccp denounced the ETR and in fact essentially dismantled it. And then designed their whole policy around discouraging any Soviet influence in the region.

Interesting that you say this as Mao argued that vanguardism was somewhat faulty in the sense that it encourages the Party to become separate from the people, thus his railing against bureaucratism in the 60s. The mass line is necessary, and the mass lines also means understanding local sensibilities and needs. The PRC attempting to take former imperial holdings and make them part of a single polity I think was a policy based not on the mass line but a belief that minority regions could not be lost.

I do not necessarily thing the CCP was wrong to take the path it did so but yes I do believe that revolution could have been encouraged in a more grassroots fashion, and that doing so would have meant that separatism would have never really emerged as an actual problem.

My apologies. I was just somewhat taken aback.

Sure. So in regards to te CIA unprising - it should be noted that the CIA approached the Dalai Lama in 1950, offering to give him supplies to fight the PLA. He refused, for one because he saw what was happening in Korea and didn't believe that Tibet would win any outright war, but also because he genuinely believed the CCP would be a force for good. The CIA then took to other elements, mostly the regressive elites as well as certain dissents in Kham, trained a few and then airlifted them to try and mount a guerrilla war. That was only in Kham and Amdo, however. The real issue that changed things, and caused the Dalai Lama to flee etc was 1959, when those sporadic rebellions spread to Lhasa as well. Fascinatingly enough, historian Chen Jian notes (I can get you a PDF if you want) that the PLA was actually pretty eager to put these down - mostly as a show of force, but also it would be good martial practice. Take that for what you will.

However, to argue that the CCP had been only respectful up until this point is not entirely fair, I think. VIncent Goossaert and David A. Palmer discuss this in regards to religious institutions, from 1956 onwards (noting again that widespread rebellion had not yet really started outside a few rural areas in Kham), the CCP basically to disregard the 17 point agreement through a bit of a loop hole by arguing that Tibetans in Kham and Amdo, some of which were in Sichuan and not formally 'Tibet', would be subjected to land collectivization, including confiscation from monasteries, temples, and traditional land grants. Many landlords and tyrants very thankfully lost their holdings, but a very sizable percentage of the male population were invested in the monastery system. This caused a lot of resentment. Again, even if you can agree that ultimately religious institutions had to be liquidated, this was seen as a breach of trust as from the 1930s onwards when the CCP relied on minorities to keep them safe from the GMD during the Long March, the CCP had promised that the revolutionary measures it would pursue in the mainland and for Han people would not be applied entirely to minority people out of respect for autonomy. That ceased to be the case.

In Tibet itself, as historian Tsering Shakya notes that there was a lot of resentment in places like Lhasa because of the impression that China was 'taking' over the country. Shakya even argues that actually the CCP did a lot of good. Pre-revolution Tibet wasn't all sunshine and roses, and even the Dalai Lama again pretty much agrees that a lot of the early reforms against feudalism etc was necessarsy. But things were a little shakier than the Chinese narrative of thigns also. You had a desire amongst Tibetans to have their own standing army, to be able to conduct its own foreign policy, and also to cap the limit of Chinese settlers and cadres allowed to stay in the territory. A lot of progressive forces wanted the CCP to actually take a harsher stance and to empower them to do the reforms that woudl be necessary. But, Mao was also very cautious about how to go about changing structures in Tibet and other minority areas at this point - he didn't want to rock the boat, somewhat sensibly. To try and get rid of anti-Chinese sentiments in Lhasa and the Tibetan government, though, the Chinese authorities did want to force the coutnry's dual Prime Ministers to be dismissed, and so they were. That sort of unilateral action unfortunately also pissed off the people who were hoping that the CCP would empower progressive elements - there was a simmering feeling that ultimately Chinese cadres were on one hand unwilling to take action but also that when they did so they did without the input of Tibetan officials or activists.

What changed the picture was that when China signed a trade agreement with India in 1953, the Tibetan elites were suddenly a lot more in favor of the Chinese government. Dalai Lama himself was wowed by Zhou Enlai's diplomacy. infrastructure development and roads etc vastly improved. People were given good jobs, Tibet's international standing grew etc. The ruling elite were very happy; ordinary people were somewhat more mixed, due to again growing resentment at the fact that they had very little input before the revolution and continued to have very little after. In 1955, they moved to create the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART). This was seen as somewhat of a compromise - Mao had wanted to actually place the region under Beijing's direct administration, buit thought the PCART would be a good way to start transitioning Tibet to a socialistic system of governance. Here is where things get a loittle tricky - the PCART would divde Tibet into three separate groups, and one of these (Chamdo) would begin moving to socialism quicker, under the supervision of the PLA. The Dalai Lama accepted this, but there was a lot of frustration here - PCART was designed essentaily to keep two separate Tibetan actors against each other (the Tibetan Government and the Panchen Lama) and to have another section (Chamdo) effectively operate under Chinese control with nominal Tibetan input. China thought this would all be a great success, but this basically just created a lot of disunity in Tibeta and a lot of anxiety about what China really wanted. Trust broke down, and then the uprising in Kham and Amdo start (again noting those regions were legally under Chinese jurisdiction, not 'Tibet'). Lhasa denounced them entirely, did not want to support the Khampas whatsoever, but all the fighting also craeted a refugee crisis. The root of the fighting, again, was the belief of Tibetans in those areas that Buddhism itself was under attack, and that now a large body of men (monks, many of whom lived quite poorly, particularly the lower level ones) suddenly had no income. This created anxiety in Tibet that the same situation was inevitable there as well.

For what it is worth, Mao himself was not partiularly worried by these anxieties or even the initial rebellions, believing that basically it was a consequence of economic hardship and that Tibetans would cease to resent the Chinese presence eventually. Also aggravating the situation was that PCART was bringing in many more Han cadres, who were alleged of being significantly more callous towards local customs and religion. Chinese officials had to backpedal on some of their initial reforms, tried to placate people, and also outlined that Han Chauvinism was causing resentment throughout Tibet and other autonomous regions. In 1957, after the hundred Flowers speech, Tibetans started voicing a lot more of these anxieties out in the open, and in the context of growing discontent in Kham, Chinese officials were growign a lot more cautious. The whole situation was deteriorating, and local Chinese offiicials in Tibet proper were growing a lot more dismissive of Tibetan complains, basically saying that they believed Tibet belonged in the 'bosom of the motherland'. And so, Han Chauvinism stopped being the enemy - local nationalism became the greater problem. The Khampa rebellion grew larger, affecting eastern Tibet too, and then with the CIA getting involved, the whole situation basically got set on fire.

The lessons here are sort of mixed. Tibetan elites, including many feudal ones, liked the CCP's early policies because essentially it helped them grow their own capital and 'develop' the region. But a lot of regular peasants were more resentful of what they saw as a sort of cultural elitism amongst the TIbetan elites (including the Dalai Lama) as well as the Chinese cadres. Chinese cadres often barely spoke the language, were not particularly sensitive to local needs, and the shifts in Sichuan in Kham and Amdo made people even more afraid. Couple this with PCART's disastrous policies and shifting elite sentiments, and stuff went out of control. Again, imo, the solution to this would have just been to set up a Tibetan Communist Party, supply them with funds and training, and have let Tibet develop its own unique course to revolution. It really is ultimately a sad thing that shit went the way it did. To say nothing, obviously, of the famine and some of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution that followed.

The Soviets did not switch their support to the CCP. Initially, in fact, Stalin told the CCP to stand down, and he signed a trade agreement with Chiang Kai-Shek, and "Even as late as 1949, Stalin advised the CCP leaders to avoid provoking US intervention and stop disseminating forces at the Yangtze River, to reach an agreement with the GMD, and perhaps even to accept a partition of the country through a coalition government". Cool story.

Also, yes, obviously the British made caste worst. But they also proclaimed that they were in India to destroy the excesses of the system (for example, attempting to outlaw the practice of Untouchability, destroy the practice of sati) etc. I am not saying that the British were somehow a progressive force. The point is they certainly believed they were, that they were there to civilize.

Also, in regards to Japan and China, AGAIN the point was using the EXCUSE OF MODERNIZATION to invade a fucking country. Again, China got rid of slavery in Tibet. Yes. But slavery was not as widespread as people claim, and they did not invade TIbet TO get rid of slavery. There were geopolitical, cynical interests. Whether you want to condemn those is entirely up to you, but to ignore them is just idiocy.

Well, the Soviets actually were in favor of supporting the GMD up until the last years of the civil war, but yes, Mao taking over China was good. But again, the Japanese wanted to modernize the country. Also good? Casteism essentially promotes a slavery system of itself. Should the British have abolished it?

But not the caste system? What about sweatshops? Persecution of minorities? Slavery in an informal sense existed in China up until 1949; in fact, Japan cited it as one of the reasons China needed to be civilized. Is that okay?

So, should China invade Iran and Saudi Arabia to stop punishing adultery, homosexuality, etc? What is the farthest extent of this logic that you are willing to pursue? Any social change is worth squashing local sovereignty by an outside force?

...And so you wouldn't advocate that the Mauritanians have any say in how it goes? Or that they should do it? Or that, maybe at best, China, Vietnam etc. should just encourage those reformers to do their own work? Why is it that in your mind slavery can only be abolished by an outside progressive force?

Yes, and again...all of Tibet didn't have slavery, and Tibetans themselves were fighting against it before the CCP entered the picture. The logic you are using, and I am sorry if it is rude, is pretty much the same logic of British reformers seeking to civilize the barbarian 'Hindoos'. I don't really see how one can deny that. Would you advocate that the US goes into Mauritania to liberate the pockets of slavery that exist there as well?

Does he a PhD in political science in China? I've a PhD in Chinese History. Should I be writing a book about the French Revolution as an expert? Again, Parenti's work isn't bad but it relies on the work other historians did. I say 'did', because the scholarship has evolved a lot since then.

So you basically reveal that you are pretty much a chauvinist - that a backward people should be made to be destroyed and progress regardless of the costs. You would've fit well amongst the progressives of the British Empire, begging to destroy the cruelties of the caste system in India.

But then who gets to decide what 'China' is in this context? The CCP did a lot of good but how can we accept that they essentially took the Qing Empire's borders and made it a singular nation? Even under the Qing, Tibet etc were not regarded as the same as the 'neidi' (mainland, internal provinces of China). Imo surely the Party could have just propped up local figures and let Tibet conduct its own revolution ie the Soviet model. Do we excuse India for squashing separatism in the name of unity against imperialism either? That was certainly the excuse for Indian troops smashing down militias in Hyderabad and the northeast. This idea that you need a singular polity no matter the cost is a foolish notion.