I think those other factors are less relevant to my point though. My point is about Stalin's misreading of Hitler's character and his disillusionment when the Germans invaded. Soviet strategists made much of the fact that a winter war would be brutal for the invaders (as did German strategists), and as far as I know, this is the primary reason why Stalin felt sure that Hitler would not invade as far into the summer as he did. Stalin did not think Hitler would place so many stakes on concluding the war so unrealistically rapidly. In reality, Hitler was known to stall decisions until the very last minute, then make a dramatic choice and refuse to change it. Stalin apparently thought he was more coldly rational than that.

The winter was certainly a contributing factor but it was not this miraculous event that saved the eastern front.

Do people really interpret it that way though? If they are, that seems like a separate problem, not anything inherently to do with the "invaded in winter" framing. I mean, would the Soviets have been able to drive the Germans all the way back to Berlin like they did without the onset of the winter? I don't think there's any problem with pointing to winter conditions as the thing that broke the brutal eastward grinding part of the war and reversed it in fairly spectacular fashion. If people are interpreting weather as magic, isolated from any broader historical analysis, that seems like a problem of historical illiteracy, not problematic framing.