The violinist argument "solves" the contradiction by changing what rights are given to a person, namely that everyone (including the fetus) has the right to bodily autonomy, even above the right to life and sustenance. Even assuming the least problematic version of this right, the problem remains that no one is a bodily autonomy absolutist. Let me offer a counter-thought experiment:

You agree to help a friend in a surgical operation where your heart will be used to pump her blood while her heart is being operated on. Midway through the surgery, you get a craving for donuts and decide to leave to get some from the nearby donut shop, causing your friend to die. A bodily autonomy absolutist would think this is your right, and that the doctors have no right to make you stay, which is obviously absurd.

So then we could arrive at some limited bodily autonomy, and the argument becomes "should the mother's bodily autonomy matter more than the fetus' life?", which is equivalent to the starting position and nothing was gained. Or we could raise something else above bodily autonomy, like "the contract", but this weakens the argument to cover abortions only under some rare circumstances. Neither of these is a good outcome.