It's literally like this:
Materialists/Physicalists: "The thoughts in your head come from your conditions and are ultimately the result of your organs and nervous system. Your consciousness is linked to your brain activity and other parts of your body interacting with the physical real world."
Dualists: "Ok but what if there were an imaginary zombie that has the same organs and molecular structure as a living person but somehow isn't alive on some metaphysical level. If this zombie is conceivable, that means it must be metaphysically true somehow."
Materialists: "That's circular and imaginary, isn't it?"
Other dualists: "Ok but what if I were in a swamp and lightning strikes a tree and magically creates a copy of me but it's not actually me because it doesn't have my soul."
Am I reading this stuff wrong or are these actually the best arguments for mind-body dualism
Physicalist requirement of scientific realism are how you can tell it's bunk.
That's a name I haven't seen in a long time
They let me out on Thursdays and my credit card expired which led to the second deletion of /r/chapotraphouse3 so I usually spend my time not posting here instead.
You have any good literature arguing against scientific realism?
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions probably needs to be the starting point for anyone looking to explore philosophy of science more, and while it doesn't explicitly touch on the realism debate (somewhat preceding it), it absolutely sets science up as a historical system that would seem to be absolutely unamenable to realism.
Something like pragmatism or instrumentalism lets you get all we've been able to out of science without getting bogged down in the metaphysical morass.
appreciate it, but nah I know kuhn, who is in the weeds RE realism?
Laudan's pessimistic induction argument is probably the biggest challenge to it from a historical perspective.
thanks prayer hands